Engenderneered Machines in Science Fiction Film by NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro & Schwartzman, Roy
Engenderneered Machines in Science Fiction Film 
 
By: Roy Schwartzman 
 
Schwartzman, Roy.  “Engenderneered Machines in Science Fiction Film.”  Studies in Popular Culture 22.1  
 (October 1999): 75-87.  Available online at http://pcasacas.org/SiPC/22.1/schwartzman.html 
 
Made available courtesy of Popular Culture Association / American Culture Association: 
http://pcasacas.org/SiPC/sipcindex.htm 
 
***Note: Figures may be missing from this format of the document 
 
The fear that human creations might backfire and attack their creators has been a mainstay of science fiction at 
least since Mary Shelley‟s Frankenstein. The misgivings become particularly acute when human-engineered 
imitations of human beings (i.e., robots and cyborgs) raise questions regarding how humans can be 
distinguished from machines. Assumptions about gender also infuse the ways humans conceive and react to 
their mechanical progeny (i.e., robots and cyborgs). Whenever human-like creations are embodied, they 
encounter the fundamental bodily quality of sexuality. The cinematic exploration "fleshes out" how posthuman 
technological innovations are engendered in their engineering. By problematizing the roles that gender can play 
in the very conceptions of what counts as human or machine, gender constructions infuse technological 
innovation in various challenging ways.  
Engenderneering the Non-Human 
"Engenderneering" may be understood as the construction or interpretation of a gender- neutral object so that its 
gender becomes part of its essence. This personification, far from merely personifying an object, engenders the 
object by making gender roles and expectations central to how humans interact with non-human (usually also 
interpreted as less-than-human) entities. For example, ships have been christened traditionally as female, the 
reliable (i.e., motherly) bearers that keep passengers afloat upon the amniotic oceans. Gender is already so 
intertwined with human experience that the terra "engender"—aside from its intransitive sense of attributing 
sexual identity—acquires its primary meaning as a synonym for creation itself. Anna Balsamo (1996) laments 
that new technologies such as virtual reality simply "reproduce, in high-tech guise, traditional narratives about 
the gendered, race-marked body" (132). In the case of science fiction films, the project of engenderneering is 
rarely innovative. Instead, the emergence of new machines and forms of life leave basically intact the familiar 
stories of "proper" feminine roles.  
David Tomas (1989) contends that relationships within nascent cyborg cultures are defined technologically 
rather than organically, a condition he calls "technicity" (123). Blood- based relationships are transformed into 
kinships that involve complementary functions. Tomas, however, bases his concept of technicity on the 
assumption that technology-especially in cyberspace-reduces dependency on the human body per se (125). An 
examination of several science fiction films demonstrates that while physical dependence on the organic body 
may be reduced in a cyborg environment, the psychological and social needs for bodily identities and 
distinctions persist. Technicity, even if literally an accurate description of identities and relationships, does not 
reduce the drive for gender construction and maintenance, as several case studies reveal.  
Engenderneered Robots 
Concentration on the relationship between machines and gender serves a specific purpose. When the body is 
technologized, many discordant components of gender become highlighted. The human-like machine, 
occupying an unstable position somewhere between nature and artifice, brings to the fore how women have 
been placed in similar states of tension. Simultaneously configured as (1) the natural means for extending 
humanity (via childbirth); (2) the radical Other (an unfathomable, "hysterical" creature—cf. Maines, 1999); (3) 
the active cause of evil (the temptress, an archetypal Eve or Pandora); (4) the passive vessel of male desires and 
will (obedient servant, receiver of sperm, bearer of children but not head of household), to name just a few 
examples, women have been the nexus of paradoxical attributions. Just as cyborgs cannot be categorized neatly 
into familiar dualistic categories, "the female body historically was constructed as a hybrid case" (Balsamo, 
1996, p. 19), albeit a hybrid whose constitution was a host of unresolved paradoxes. Those paradoxes surface 
clearly in the gender construction of machines and other entities that are, as Balsamo writes, "predicated on 
transgressed boundaries" (32).  
Engenderneering acquires special significance in the context of engineering machinery that performs tasks that 
humans could discharge. Popular concepts of robotics personify robots, and this personification implicates 
gender. Gender-related expectations infuse public expectations for robotics, with robots anthropomorphized to 
reflect and extend the gender-associated roles. Although robotics engineers concentrate more on mechanical 
functions than anthropomorphic appearances, machines seem more "friendly" if they physically resemble 
humans—and also reinforce gendered social practices. The prevalence of anthropomorphic metaphors has 
humanized robotics in the sense that, as Wieners & Pescovitz (1996) argue, "if robots are to think and act like 
humans, they must be physically similar to them as well" (129).  
Gendered robots have very deep roots in popular culture. In the Jetsons‟ comic utopia, the mechanical maid—
not surprisingly—was a female, Rose. This female came complete with gender-marked accessories such as an 
apron, a useless accouterment for stainless steel. Bergstrom (1991) observes that while personality-filled robots 
(e.g., R2D2 and C3PO in Star Wars) blur accepted distinctions between human and non-human, "sexual identity 
. . . can be used as the primary marker of difference in a world otherwise beyond our norms" (35). In strange 
(but perhaps not quite brave) new worlds, sexual identity and the social roles associated with it remain 
surprisingly familiar. Bergstrom (l991) affirms that sexual differences are encoded visibly in science fiction 
films; she also contends that these markers are deliberately explicit for audiences to decode. The feminine 
occupies a dual position both as radical Other and as the manifestation of gender expectations that have not 
launched far past their patriarchal bases. This strange irony, in this case initially most notable through gender-
marked clothing, occurs in the human encounter with Robby the Robot.  
The first robotic movie star in his own right, Robby the Robot offers an instructive case study in 
engenderneering. Robby made his first appearance in Forbidden Planet (1956), and his initial encounter with 
humans (aside from his creator) was drenched in gender references and markers. Upon meeting Robby, the male 
cook, imaginatively named Cookie, asks the crew‟s physician, "Hey, Dec, is it a male or a female?" Robby 
replies: "In my case, sir, the question is totally without meaning." A brief semiotic exploration of gender 
construction in Forbidden Planet reveals just how meaningful gender can be, at least for humans. If anyone 
bears ambiguous gender markers for the 1950s, it is the plain-spoken cook. Cookie constantly wears his apron, 
even on the planet‟s surface where there are no prospects of meal preparation. Apparently Cookie cannot escape 
his professional sign, which also happens to mark domestic, "feminine" duties customarily referred to 
disparagingly as "women‟s work." Unlike the hard-drinking Cookie, whose role as a bourbon bootlegger 
partially offsets his feminine domesticity, Robby proves to be the obedient, domesticated housekeeper. After 
Robby has poured coffee and played the part of hostess, his creator Dr. Morbius reveals that Robby is modeled 
after his wife. The feminization of Robby‟s domestic talents becomes explicit with the crewman‟s observation: 
"I thought Robby had managed very charming feminine touches."  
Robby‟s domestic qualities do not exhaust his feminine traits, since like a good caretaker he also protects his 
charges. As he prepares to drive the landing party to meet Dr. Morbius, Robby exhorts, "Passengers will please 
fasten their seat belts." Dr. Ostrow, the crew‟s physician, remarks: "Looks alter us like a mother." To the extent 
that humans must relegate complex or dangerous tasks to robots, the machines do protect humans from 
inconvenience and harm. Robotic protectiveness, however, comes at a price. If this instinct is pre-programmed, 
it no longer counts as a mark of virtue and is transferable at the programmer‟s will. Thus motherly instinct 
becomes a commodity that can be reproduced, and its appearance is less a mark of care than a sign that a 
stimulus has evoked the appropriate response. Such a devaluation, as Montagu and Matson (1983) observe, 
exemplifies the dangers of robots that are not malevolent. Instead of the destructive robot presaged by the 
Frankenstein saga, the apparently benign robot acts dispassionately, out of a drive for efficiency and correctness 
rather than care. Not surprisingly, robot and robot-like characters such as Data and Speck in the Star Trek series 
constantly struggle to feel emotions instead of only finding accurate answers. The tragedy of such machines in 
search of souls is what Montagu and Matson (1983) characterize as the "purely technical intelligence cut off 
from those balancing attributes of human nature invidiously categorized as sentimentality" (219). Framed in 
terms of gender, the difficulty arises from trying to manifest tendencies associated with masculinity while 
repressing their complementary tendencies that have clustered around notions of femininity.  
Automated Temptation 
The "intersexion" of gender and robotics perhaps appears most obviously in Maria, the seductive robotic villain 
of Metropolis (1926), who may be the first genuine robotic character in a feature film. The male creator, 
Rotwang, constructs the robot Maria not in his own image but as a surrogate for his lost love, Hel (Patalas, 
1991). Since the robot is made in the image of a woman, it is especially telling that the ultimate test of the 
robot‟s authenticity is its ability to cause sexual arousal. Simons (1992) remarks that "Maria is the first of her 
breed" because she represents the first conjectural attempt to create a fully functioning artificial life form 
"designed to seduce men into behavior against their interests" (185). The robot is considered certifiably genuine 
if it can whip tuxedo-clad aristocrats into a sexual frenzy. To test whether the synthesized Maria can pass as 
human, she performs an erotic dance at a party hosted by the city‟s boss, Fredersen. Poor Freder, the admirer of 
the genuine Maria whose physical likeness the robot bears, becomes physically ill at the thought of his virginal 
Maria becoming a sex object. According to Patalas (1991), the validation of the robot Maria in Metropolis 
emphasizes the extent to which women "are the projections of male fantasies" in the film (166). Authored and 
authorized by males, the synthetic Maria earns the masculine seal of approval only after she performs her erotic 
dance, subjecting herself to the lustful gaze of male guests at the party, the delirious and terrified gaze of Freder, 
and the triumphant gaze of Rotwang the creator. The evil temptress is animalistically sexual, and it is difficult to 
separate her seductive skills from her evil nature. The robot Maria also is deceptively sensual, and this 
deceptiveness goes to her very nature. Far the robot, sexuality is (literally and figuratively) mechanical. The 
"real" Maria is genuine in the sense that she is consistently loyal to Freder (and she has no metal under her 
skin). But the human Maria, the Maria capable of sexual intercourse, is a "good girl." She first kisses Freder in 
the underground chapel, where the setting establishes the act as more spiritual than physical.  
The feminization of robotics in metropolis does highlight the role of artifice, as Telotte (1995) recognizes. This 
artifice operates on two levels: the seductive lure of technological wizardry intertwines with sexual temptation. 
When gender becomes an issue in robotics, however, it inevitably problematizes what has been taken for 
granted: the process of gender construction. The creators of the robots in science fiction films are almost 
invariably male, representing, according to Telotte, "the extent to which the feminine has historically been 
crafted and controlled, defined by forces outside of the feminine" (17). The first robot in science fiction film 
seems appropriately cast in the form of a woman, since she is an instrument of control on two levels (Huyssen, 
1981-82). Maria is created and controlled by a male scientist (i.e., Rotwang) for the purpose of rendering the 
male workers more pliant to the control of the Metropolis aristocracy (specifically, Fredersen). Yet, the act of 
physically constructing a robot co-opts the "natural" birth of a human, since childbirth is customarily within the 
province of the female. By custom and by language, the word midwife places women squarely in the delivery 
room. Perhaps the "unnatural" births so often assigned to male scientists must be punished by the illegitimate 
child turning on its creator, a scenario reenacted from Frankenstein to Blade Runner. The just reward for 
circumventing natural (pro)creation is a perverse child.  
Although the manifest punishment seems to devolve on the male creator, these scenarios also reinforce 
traditional realms of gender activity. Not only should the male scientist not tamper with Mother Nature, he also 
should not usurp the role of mother. Indeed, the very madness of the mad scientist results from obsessive 
devotion to the creation itself, a blind love for the creative act—and possibly the creation itself, as in the 
Pygmalion myth—without regard for the responsibilities such creation brings. An odd kinship is forged 
between seduction and destruction, according to Telotte (1995), with the embrace of artificial life often 
associated with abandonment of family, friends, human love, and duty to society.  
More subtle examples of gendered mechanics and the mechanics of gender appear elsewhere. In the original 
Star Trek series, the computer‟s voice is female (to be exact, Majel Barrett, Gene Roddenberry‟s wife). The 
choice of a feminized computer in the sixties is not surprising. As the human helpmate, the computer assumes 
many of the roles traditionally assigned to the wife. Like any subservient helpmate, however, the computer must 
remain obedient to the humans it serves. Countless crises emerge from the computer "malfunctioning" not by 
failing to operate but by transgressing its assigned role and functioning independently of humans. Worse yet, 
the recalcitrant computer becomes particularly dangerous when it has a mind of its own. The obedient and 
properly functioning computer thinks for humans but not for itself. The Star Trek original series episode 
"Mirror, Mirror" adds a fascinating twist. In the alternate universe that contains an evil Enterprise crew, the 
computer has a male voice. This masculinization of course helps complete the reversal from the "good" 
Enterprise to its "evil" counterpart. Additionally, however, the feminized computer is associated with what is 
naturally good or at least benign while the masculinized version inhabits a world of treachery where crew 
members advance in rank through assassination. At face value, the alignment of the feminine with the benign 
seems an advance from the role of the feminine temptress that has plagued science fiction novels, stories, films, 
and series. On the other hand, the choice to masculinize the computer in the evil universe also shows how 
solidified gender roles had become. Instead of the feminine having the flexibility to function within benign and 
malignant contexts, both the masculine and the feminine are confined to their habitual associations. No traffic is 
possible between the kind, nurturing, and obedient helpmate and the conspiratorial, devious, and murderous... 
what?  
It is informative that in the search to categorize traditional yet not wholly flattering roles of males, my 
vocabulary shrinks to the likes of "soldier," "breadwinner," and other badges of honor that still show 
comparatively little tarnish. Yet, no shortage of comparable terms invites application to femininity and thereby 
to women. These terms roll off Meredith Brooks‟ tongue in her song celebrating and appropriating the roles 
assigned to or assumed by women: "I‟m a bitch, I‟m a lover, I‟m a child, I‟m a mother, I‟m a sinner, I‟m a saint 
... I‟m your hell, I‟m your dream, I‟m nothing in between. . . ." In the polarized language of gender, Brooks 
entitles the song "Bitch," embracing arguably one of the most commonly employed terms used to degrade 
women.  
Anthropomorphized Technology 
More than any other feature, a robot‟s intelligence will encourage humans to view it as what Simons (1992) a 
"surrogate person" (168). On one level, that contention has merit insofar as a robot that cannot perform human-
like functions cannot be regarded as human. On another level, Simons acknowledges that "the primitive 
animism" of humans makes them more likely to treat as human whatever looks human (176). The more intimate 
that humans become with robots, the more demand there likely will be for robots to resemble physically humans 
that would have engaged in those relationships. The unfamiliarity and latent discomfort with robotic technology 
might help explain the immediate need for gender markers when humans encounter robots in science fiction 
films.  
Even in situations that have little to do with gender per se (i.e., in forums unrelated to romance or relationships), 
the revelation of gender (whether honest or not) apparently provides an anchor for further interactions. 
Presumably, as humans become more accustomed to interacting with non-human counterparts, the physical cues 
of humanity should become less necessary. Not so. To make technological innovations less disruptive, the new 
technologies must meet user expectations associated with human interactions. When interacting with other 
humans, however, gender does play a role in how the interaction proceeds. Reeves and Nass (1996) observe that 
engineers cannot ignore the influence of gender. Until gender expectations change or fade away, gendered 
machines (e.g., with voices, animated icons, etc.) probably will associate traditional gender expectations with 
the required task. For example, male voices will be obeyed more when they evaluate performance. Of course, 
the new technologies themselves could contribute to changing expectations, but at the cost of some 
disorientation.  
Alien: Resurrection (1997) might present an exception to entrenched gender. The auton played by Winona 
Ryder could disrupt gender role expectations. if robots are designed by robots (the definition of "auton"), then 
gender could be designed out of new models, since it would serve no function and would have no biological 
value to the designers. Lamenting her inhumanity, Call labels herself "disgusting," contrasting her mechanical 
nature with that of the clone Ripley: "At least there‟s part of you that‟s human." But gender role expectations 
prove much more difficult to design away. Thus the character Johner, who appropriately appropriates the name 
of a man who solicits prostitutes, immediately draws sexual implications from the revelation that the female-
looking Call is an auton. Johner, played by Ron Perlman, cast as the emotional beast rather than the physical 
beast Perlman played on television opposite Linda Hamilton, reacts to Call‟s robotic status by exclaiming: 
"Can‟t believe I almost fucked it." Johner‟s paraplegic comrade replies with a characterization of sexually 
passive females as well as Johner‟ s own sexual omnivorousness: "Like you never fucked a robot.  
Although categorized by Johner as a genderless "it," the robotic Annalee Call preserves many of the 
stereotypically feminine traits that serve only as gender markers. Call is petite and apparently has at best 
average human strength, since she cannot escape being held hostage by a human male and must be rescued. She 
also bungles an assassination attempt because she lets her emotions overcome her mission to kill. As with 
Becky in Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956), the mark of female incompetence is the inability to stifle 
emotions at will. The human clone Ripley manifests masculine characteristics complementary to those 
displayed by Call. Ripley is tall, physically imposing, has superhuman strength, functions efficiently with no 
nonsense, and methodically executes the enemy. Such complementarity could provide useful resources for a 
lesbian reading of the relationship between clone and machine in the film. Both characters transgress 
heterosexual customs. Call and Ripley are asexually produced, through robotic assembly and cloning. Call is 
explicitly rejected by the most blatantly heterosexual male; Ripley violently repels sexual advances from males. 
Sharing an "unnatural" birth, the two females bond due to their common rejection of heterosexually charged 
human interaction. In this relationship, however, gender roles still operate overtly. Apparently the robotic 
designers of autons are quite human after all.  
Women and Machines 
Simons (1992) observes a consistent tendency for advertisements of early films depicting robots to show 
females helpless in the grip of male robots(185-186). The examples Simons cites do reinforce the paternalistic 
ideal of a powerless woman who needs a man to save her. A poster for The Day the Earth Stood Still (1951) 
shows Patricia Neal drooping limply in the arms of Gort. In another scene that never appeared in Forbidden 
Plant (1956), the movie being promoted, Ann Francis is shown unconscious while Robby the Robot holds her 
in his arms. In the promotional material, Robby becomes fully masculinized despite his oscillation in the film 
between "feminine" duties such as cook and seamstress, and more traditionally masculine roles such as heavy 
laborer and defender. Claudia Barrett also occupies the familiar limp (most likely fainted) female position in a 
poster for Robot Monster (1953).  
Science fiction films rarely treat subjects univocally. Brooks Landon (1992) contends that the genre actually 
may be defined by its contradictory stance toward topics such as technology: amazement at its wonders, fear of 
its effects. One site of ambivalence is how women are portrayed: sometimes as technically competent but just as 
often "essentially helpless in any crisis" (23). When women do display practical skills, as in the Alien films, 
they may simply surpass their male counterparts in their ability to meet threats through conquest and 
destruction.  
One might naturally invoke Foucault to assist in explaining the process of marginalization, in this case the 
persistence of gender attributions that devalue women. Although Foucault concentrates on the construction of 
identity through the physical body and the social body, as Balsamo (1996) argues, his analysis fails to 
problematize how such a process operates for women. As a result, the attribution of gender remains unaddressed 
in Foucault‟s thought, an attribution that acquires new complexity when processes such as prosthesis, artificial 
insemination, the prospect of cloning, and other technological innovations have brought the traditional "natural" 
sexual roles and identities into question. In Balsamo‟s terms, if "the human body is „gendered‟ through a series 
of social acts that begin long before physical birth" and such gendering does not depend solely on physiology, 
then the processes that contribute to gender identification lie in the interaction of social customs and 
expectations with their embodiment in a human (or somehow human-like) physical form (25).  
The difficulty depicting women consistently, even within the same film, alludes to a larger issue: what Landon 
(1992) calls "the genre‟s tension between the strange and the familiar." Women occupy simultaneously the 
position of radical Other, alien and (or perhaps because) opposed to patriarchy, and protected treasure, 
subsumed by patriarchal normative codes of justice and propriety. The issue may be recast in terms more 
reminiscent of Foucault (1998). Science fiction films offer sites where gender is problematized in ways that 
define women as subjects and objects. As subjects, women may emerge as agents or as subject to the agency of 
forces beyond their control. As objects, they may be fixated by a male gaze or rendered inert by patriarchal 
codes of conduct that render the feminine both objectified (rendered as the Other) and objectionable (equating 
Otherness with inferiority). These options of depiction, far from being mutually exclusive, simultaneously 
permeate much science fiction film. Within the hypothetical universes created in cinematic science fiction, the 
definition, roles, and status of women and femininity are far from clear or consistent. This genre provides 
fruitful ground for investigation because it postulates what may count as truth and propriety in the future. By 
elaborating the conditions of scientific truth, science fiction film also envisions the practices that establish 
conditions for social identity, including gender. Instead of restricting study to the historical retrospective of 
social practices, what Foucault (1998) calls "the angle of what „was done"‟ (462), science fiction film opens the 
possibility of proactive research that reveals potential conditions that could foster or frustrate oppression.  
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